By providing guidance about future economic developments, central banks can a¤ect private sector expectations and decisions. This can improve welfare by reducing the e¤ects of asymmetric information and by leading to smaller forecast errors. But it can also magnify the impact of noise in the central bank's forecasts. I employ a model of heterogeneous information to compare outcomes under opaque and transparency policies. While better central bank information is always welfare improving, more central bank information may not be.
Introduction
Standard models used for monetary policy analysis typically assume private agents and the central bank share a common information set and economic model, yet actual policy decisions are taken in an environment in which asymmetric information is the norm and many alternative models coexist. The resulting heterogeneity in views can play an important role in a¤ecting both policy choices and the monetary transmission process. Transparency in the conduct of policy can help to reduce asymmetric information. In ‡ation targeting central banks, for example, invest signi…cantly in attempting to reduce uncertainty about the objectives of policy, while the release of detailed in ‡ation and output projections can serve to ensure the public shares the central bank's information about future economy developments. By being transparency about its objectives and its outlook for the economy, central banks help provide the public with guidance about the future.
But providing guidance carries with it risks. As Poole (2005) has expressed it, ...for me the issue is whether under normal and routine circumstances forward guidance will convey information or whether it will create additional uncertainty.
Since any forecast released by the central bank is subject to error, being more transparency may simply lead private agents to react to what was, in retrospect, noise in the forecast. The possibility that the private sector may overreact to central bank announcements does capture a concern expressed by some policy makers. For example, in discussing the release of FOMC minutes, Janet Yellen expressed the view that "Financial markets could misinterpret and overreact to the minutes" (Yellen 2005) .
In this paper, I explore the role of economic transparency -speci…cally, transparency about the central bank's assessment of future economic conditions -in altering the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. I do so in a framework in which central bank projections may convey useful information but may also introduce ine¢ cient ‡uctuations into the economy.
A focus on economic transparency seems appropriate for understanding the issues facing many central banks. The recent concerns about the implications of the subprime mortgage market re ‡ect, in part, private sector uncertainty about the Fed's view of the economic outlook and the way the outlook for in ‡ation and real economic activity may be a¤ected by …nancial market conditions. Throughout 2007, for example, many …nancial market participants appeared to hold more pessimistic views than the Federal Reserve about future economic developments, 1 and in recent months, market participants have often expected signi…cant interest rate cuts, while some members of the FOMC have emphasized concerns about the outlook for in ‡ation, suggesting they saw less need for rate reductions. 2 News reports speculating on possible interest rate cuts by the Fed or the ECB focused very 1 "Even as Wall Street analysts ratchet up their worries about a recession, Fed o¢ cials are from from convinced that a true downtown is likely." New York Times, September 8, 2007 . A more vivid example of disagreement was provided by CNBC commentator Jim Cramer, whose blast at the Fed as clueless about "how bad it is out there"was reportedly seen by more than a million viewers on YouTube. 2 At its meeting on December 11, the Fed cut its fed funds rate target by 25 basis points, disappointing …nancial markets and leading to a decline of almost 300 points in the Dow Jones the next day.
little on uncertainty about the central bank's preferences but a great deal on the uncertainty about the outlook for the economy. These reports reveal heterogeneity among private forecasters and uncertainty about the Fed's (or the ECB's) outlook for the economy. And public statements by central bankers were designed to communicate their views on future economic developments. From Jean-Claude Trichet's statement that the markets "have gone progressively back to normal"(quoted in the Financial Times, August 15, 2007, page 1) to Ben Bernanke's comment that housing remains a "signi…cant drag" on the economy (speech at the NY Economic Club, Oct. 15, 2007) , central bankers signal their assessment of economic conditions, and this assessment is one factor that in ‡uences the (heterogeneous) outlooks among the private sector.
The uncertainty in …nancial markets in recent months illustrates clearly the signi…cant di¤erences that can arise between the central bank and private market participants. This is a classic example of asymmetric information about the economy. Much of the debate has been focused on the question of future interest rate cuts, but the underlying issues appear to be related to di¤ering views among private forecasters and between private forecasters and the Fed over the likely impact of …nancial market disturbances on the real economy and the likelihood of a future recession.
The next section discusses the two goals of transparency Bill Poole (2005) has stressed -accountability and policy e¤ectiveness. Then, section 3 develops a model of asymmetric and heterogeneous economic information that can be used to model the implications of transparency. Tow policy regimes are considered. In the …rst, the public observes the central bank's instrument choice, but the central bank provides no further information to the public. In the second, the central bank provides information on its outlook for future economic developments. The welfare implications of these regimes are discussed in section 4. Within each regime, better quality central bank information is always welfare improving (the pro-transparency aspect of Morris and Shin 2002 emphasized by Svensson 2006) . However, across regimes, more central bank information has ambiguous e¤ects. Section 5 concludes.
The goals of transparency
Transparency requires asymmetric information, but the nature of this asymmetry can take many forms. In fact, Geraats (2002) has classi…ed …ve types of transparency -political, procedural, economic, policy, and operational.
Brie ‡y, these correspond to transparency about objectives, the internal decision making process, the central bank's forecasts and models, the central bank's communications about its policy actions, and its instrument setting and control errors. Each of these dimensions of transparency are important and have been studied extensively (see Geraats 2002 for a survey),
In recent years, central banks have become more transparency along all these dimensions, and levels of transparency that would have been viewed as exceptional twenty years ago are today accepted as best practice among modern central banks. 3 The trend towards central bank independence with explicit mandates assigned to central banks and the wide-spread adoption of in ‡ation targeting has contributed greatly to political transparency. The Bank of England is among the most procedurally transparent central banks, publishing minutes and individual votes of its Monetary Policy Committee discussions. Central banks such as the Federal Reserve that were formerly reluctant to communicate policy actions directly now do so clearly, timely, and directly. The most transparent central banks, such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of Norway, publish their projections for the policy interest rate. The use of a short-term interest rate as the instrument of policy has greatly enhanced operational transparency. But while most central banks today are transparency about their policy stance and operational procedures -something hard to avoid when using a short-term market interest rate as the instrument of policy -there is much greater variation in the extent to which central banks are transparency about their decision making process, their internal forecasts, and their policy objectives.
But what is the point of being transparent? As noted earlier, Poole has articulated two goals of transparency two goals of transparency: to meet the Fed's "responsibility to be politically accountable" and "to make monetary policy more e¤ective."The next two subsections discuss each of these goals.
Transparency and accountability
The role transparency plays in supporting accountability can di¤er depending on whether the ultimate objectives of monetary policy are observable or unobservable. Consider …rst the case in which the objectives of monetary policy are, ex post, clearly measurable and observable. For concreteness, assume in ‡ation is the only objective of the central bank and there is agreement on the appropriate measure of in ‡ation that the central bank should control. In this environment, it is in principle straightforward to ensure accountability. Observing the ex post rate of in ‡ation would provide a simple means for judging the performance of the central bank. However, even under the conditions speci…ed (a single measurable objective), simply observing the ex post realization of in ‡ation is not su¢ cient to serve as an e¤ective performance measure. The reason is that in ‡ation is not directly controllable -even under an optimal policy (so that the central bank is doing exactly what it should be doing), the realized in ‡ation rate can di¤er from the desired value. This di¤erence may be small, but as long as there is any random variation that is beyond the ability of the central bank to eliminate, public accountability based solely on in ‡ation outcomes will punish some good central bankers and reward some lucky ones.
Transparency can help promote accountability by allowing the public to base its evaluation of the central bank not just on observed in ‡ation but on the information that was available to the central bank when it had to make its policy decision. Having access to internal bank forecasts, for example, allows outsiders to evaluate the decisions made by the central bank. This can mitigate some of the problems associated with evaluations based solely on realized in ‡ation. Having access to the information on which decisions were based helps remove the in ‡uence of random uncontrollable events that a¤ect in ‡ation and therefore supports a better system of accountability. 4 In general, however, policy objectives are not directly observable, and they may even be inherently unmeasurable. Certainly recent theoretical models, which have emphasized the use of the welfare of the representative agent as the appropriate objective of policy, have de…ned optimal policy in terms of unmeasurable objectives. It is not clear that we could reach agreement on the correct way to measure welfare, as that depends on the speci…c model we believe characterizes the economy, even if we could agree on how to de…ne welfare. It certainly is not observable.
Transparency can be especially critical when objectives are unobserved. Assessing, or holding accountable, an economic agent when objectives are unobservable is not a situation unique to monetary policy and central banks. Perhaps the most prominent case in which public policy must deal with this situation is in the education …eld, where the objectives are high quality education and teaching but there exists wide disagreement over how to de…ne and measure these qualities.
Since social welfare does depend on in ‡ation, and in ‡ation can be ob-served, one might use in ‡ation as a type of performance measure, holding the central bank accountable for achieving a low and stable in ‡ation rate. In ‡ation targeting can be thought of as de…ning a performance measure for the central bank. The critical issue in choosing any performance measure, however, is how powerful one wants to make the incentives. If accountability is based strictly on realized in ‡ation, and the consequences of missing the target are large, then the central bank will naturally focus on achieving the target even if this means sacri…cing other, more di¢ cult to measure, aspects of social welfare. The concern that in ‡ation targeting produces too much of a focus on in ‡ation control is at the heart of most criticisms of in ‡ation targeting in the United States. But this is where transparency becomes particularly important. Greater transparency can lessen the need to rely on a single easily measured performance indicator. When the public is able to assess the information about the economy on which the central bank based its policy decisions, it is no longer necessary to base accountability just on in ‡ation outcomes. Less weight can be placed on in ‡ation outcomes in evaluating the central bank (and holding it accountability) when there is greater transparency about what information the central bank had at the time it made its policy decisions (Walsh 1999 ).
Transparency and the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy
Poole's second goal of transparency, promoting policy e¤ectiveness, requires that private sector decisions be in ‡uenced, and in ‡uenced systematically, by the information central banks provide. With the development of new Keynesian models and their emphasis on the importance of forward-looking behavior, managing expectations to improve policy e¤ectiveness has taken on a new importance. Woodford (2005) has gone so far as to state that "For not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current conditions, very little else matters." 5 The intuition for Woodford's statement is straightforward. Policy makers control directly only a short-term interest rate. Yet rational agents are forward looking and so base their spending and pricing decisions on their assessment of future interest rates, not just current rates. The recognition that expectations matter is not con…ned to academics; a recent article in the Financial Times states that "What really matters, both for the markets and the economy, is not the current policy rate but the expected path of future rates." 6 Transparency and its relationship to policy e¤ectiveness played a key role in the large literature that focused on the average in ‡ation rate bias that could arise under optimal discretionary policy. By and large, this literature emphasized political and operational transparency, and it employed models in which policy surprises were the source of the real e¤ects of monetary policy. Geraats (2002) provides an excellent survey of the literature.
In these models, the central bank's preferences were generally treated as stochastic and unknown. The policy instrument was also taken to be observed with error or subject to a control error. For example, the central bank might control nonborrowed reserves but this allowed only imperfect control of the money supply. 7 Observing money growth would not provide enough information for the public to disentangle the e¤ects of control errors from shifts in central bank preferences. Thus, there was opaqueness about political objectives and operational implementation. Transparency was typically modelled as a reduction in the noise in the signal on the policy instrument. The optimal degree of transparency balanced the gains from greater transparency in allowing the public to more quickly learn when the central bank's preferences had shifted against the cost in terms of stabilization as the ability of the central bank to create surprises is reduced with greater transparency. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) showed that the central bank may prefer to adopt a less e¢ cient operating procedure than is technically feasible (i.e., not reduce the control error variance to its minimum possible level). 8 As emphasized in recent discussions of transparency, however, new Keynesian models imply that it is predictable monetary policies, not surprises, that are most e¤ective in achieving policy goals. In such an environment, transparency, rather than reducing the e¢ cacy of policy, can actually increase it. Announcements about future policy actions, or about the central bank's assessment of future economic developments, can a¤ect private sector expectations of future interest rates, in ‡ation, and economic activity. With spending and pricing decisions dependent on these expectations, using announcements to in ‡uence expectations gives the central bank an additional policy instrument. As such, it serves to make policy more e¤ective. The 6 "Debate unfolds on likely impact of cut in US interest rates" by Krishna Guha, Financial Times, September 6, 2007, p. 2. 7 See, for example, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Faust and Svensson (2002) . 8 See also Faust and Svensson (2002) who show that, when the choice of transparency is made under commitment, patient central banks with small in ‡ation biases will prefer minimum transparency. They argue that this result might account for the (then) relatively low degree of transparency that characterized the U.S. Federal Reserve.
argument that transparency can increase the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy is certainly more consistent with the modern practice of central banks which has been uniformly to move in the direction of greater transparency.
But providing information to the public may have potential costs. These costs are associated with the conditional nature of any forecast. Some economists have worried that the public will not understand the distinction between a conditional and an unconditional forecast. 9 Particularly when reputational considerations are important, deviating from a previously announced policy path may be interpreted as a deviation from a commitment equilibrium rather than as an appropriate response based on new information. If a central bank fails to raise interest rates after signalling that it planned to, private agents may believe the bank has become less concerned about in ‡ation, causing in ‡ation expectations to rise. Financial market participants may underestimate the conditionality of the announced rate path and so view deviations as introducing unwarranted uncertainty into …nan-cial markets. These factors may make the central bank reluctant to adjust rates, producing a lock-in e¤ect that would reduce ‡exibility and limit policy e¤ectiveness.
Even when the public understands the conditional nature of the guidance provided by the central bank, announcements may introduce new sources of volatility. The in ‡uential paper by Morris and Shin (2002) has highlighted one channel through with central bank announcements may have a detrimental e¤ect. Unlike standard models which assume all private agents share the same information, Morris and Shin focus on the more realistic case of heterogeneous private information when each private agent must attempt to forecast what others are expecting. 10 When private agents have individual sources of information, Morris and Shin have argued that there can be a cost to providing more accurate public information. Agents may overreact to public information, making the economy more sensitive to any forecast errors in the public information.
Subsequent research (e.g., Hellwig 2004 , Svensson 2006 ) has suggested that the Morris-Shin result is not a general one and that better, more accurate, central bank information is welfare improving. However, just as the earlier literature on transparency employed models at odds with current policy frameworks (only surprises mattered, money supply was the instrument), the analysis of Morris and Shin is conducted within a framework 9 Goodhart (2006). 1 0 Woodford (2003) has investigated the role of higher order expectations in inducing persistent adjustments to monetary shocks in the Lucas-Phelps islands model. See also Hellwig (2002) . that fails to capture important aspects of actual monetary policy. For example, the issue facing most central banks is not whether to provide more accurate forecasts. Instead, the issue is whether or not to provide more information by, for example, announcing forecasts. And even in the absence of explicit announcements or guidance, central banks already provide information through the setting of the policy instrument. The impact of a change in the policy instrument will depend, in part, on the information that it conveys about the central bank's views of the economy.
The work by Morris and Shin has been extended by Amato and Shin (2003) who cast the Morris-Shin analysis in a more standard macro model. In their model, the central bank has perfect information about the underlying shocks. This ignores the uncertainty policy makers themselves face in assessing the state of the economy. Nor do Amato and Shin allow the private sector to use observations on the policy instrument to draw inferences about the central bank's information. They also assume one-period price setting and represent monetary policy by a price-level targeting rule. In Hellwig (2004) , prices are ‡exible and policy is given by an exogenous stochastic supply of money; private and public information consists of signals on the nominal quantity of money.
The potential costs and bene…ts of releasing central bank forecasts have also been analyzed by Geraats (2005) . However, Geraats assumes agents do not observe the bank's policy instrument prior to forming expectations and employs a traditional Lucas supply function. Her focus is on reputational equilibria in a two-period model with a stochastic in ‡ation target. Thus, the model and the issues addressed di¤er from the focus on the role of information in a Morris-Shin-like environment.
Rudebusch and Williams (2006) and Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz (2007) both focus speci…cally on the provision of future interest rate projections. Rudebusch and Williams explore the role of interest rate projections in a model of political transparency -the asymmetry of information pertains to policy preferences and the central bank's in ‡ation target. Transparency is modeled as a reducing in the noise in the central bank's projection. In contrast to the model I develop in the next section, Rudebusch and William incorporate learning, …nding that the public's ability to learn, and welfare, increase when interest rate projections are provided.
Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz (2007) adopt a quite di¤erent approach and focus on what they characterize as creative opacity. In their model, the private sector learns from the information released by the central bank, but the central bank also learns about private sector information by observing longterm interest rates. By providing its projection for the short-term interest rate, the central bank is able to recover private sector information from the long-term rate. This aligns expectations but may require the central bank to distort its current interest rate setting to achieve the desired long-term rate. If the central bank's information is poor, it may be better to remain opaque. While the role of central bank learning is a critical one, I ignore it in the model of section 3 in order to focus on the way the provision of information by the central bank a¤ects in ‡ation and output.
Thus, several questions remain unresolved concerning the role of transparency within the context of an environment in which agents have heterogeneous information and central bank actions and announcements constitute common information. Specially, how does the information conveyed by the central bank's instrument a¤ect the central bank's incentives and alter the e¤ectiveness of policy? 11 What is the e¤ect of more information as opposed to better information? And are concerns about the added uncertainty of greater transparency warranted? These question are addressed in the model of section 3.
Welfare e¤ects of opaqueness and transparency
To investigate the role of economic transparency, I employ a simple model motivated by new Keynesian models based on Calvo-type pricing adjustment by monopolistic …rms and by Morris and Shin's demonstration of the role asymmetric information can play. 12 Like Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz, I assume the central bank's preferences are known. Unlike their model, however, I incorporate the common knowledge e¤ect central to the Morris and Shin model. However, I focus on how private agents learn from the information provided by the central bank and ignore the reverse inference problem of the central bank inferring the private sector's information that is key to the model of Gosselin, Lotz, and Wyplosz.
The basic model is similar to the one employed in Walsh (2007a Walsh ( , 2007b . In this earlier work, only demand and cost shocks were present, so it was only necessary to make a single projection (of in ‡ation or the output gap) to fully reveal the central bank's information (since the public also observed the policy instrument). The primary focus was also on partial transparency in the sense of Cornand and Heinmann (2006) . The chief contributions of the present paper are to enrich the information structure, to account fully for the welfare costs of relative price dispersion created by information heterogeneity, and to assess transparency in terms of both quantity (the role of providing more information) and quality (the e¤ect of better information).
Firms
The central bank, like individual …rms, is assumed to possess potentially noisy information on the economic outlook. I consider two policy regimes. In the …rst, the opaque regime and denoted by superscript o, the central bank makes no announcements. However, even in this regime, the central bank reveals something about its outlook for the economy when it sets its policy instrument. In the absence of other information, private agents combing the observation on the instrument with their own private information in forming expectations. A rise in the policy interest rate, for example, will be interpreted partially as re ‡ecting the central bank's attempt to o¤set a projected positive demand shock and partially as a move to contract real output to o¤set a positive cost shock. When deciding on its policy, the central bank needs to take into account how the public will interpret its actions because the instrument conveys information.
The second regime corresponds to full transparency and is denoted by superscript f . In this regime, the central bank releases its projections on future economic developments. Since it is on this information that the central bank bases its policy decision, the actual setting of the instrument conveys no additional information. The bene…ts of this regime are that private sector forecasts are improved and, because there is more common information across …rms, relative price dispersion is reduced. The potential costs is that private expectations react to what may turn out, ex post, to be central bank forecast errors.
While I assume the central bank operates in a discretionary manner in setting its policy instrument, I assume it can commit to a policy regime (opaque or transparent).
The basic model
The
…rms will not all set the same price as in the standard common information framework that is employed in most models. In addition, because …rms care about their relative price, they must forecast the aggregate t + 1 price level when they set their individual price for that period. This also di¤ers from standard speci…cations in which …rms setting their price are assumed to know the aggregate equilibrium price level.
Three types of shocks are considered: 1) costs shocks that are assumed to represent ine¢ cient volatility in real marginal costs; 2) aggregate demand shocks; and 3) shocks to the gap between the economy's ‡exible price equilibrium output and its e¢ cient level of output. These latter will be referred to as welfare gap shocks. The model di¤ers from standard new Keynesian models in that information is not common and …rms must set prices before observing the current realizations of shocks.
The basic timing is as follow:
1. At the end of period t, the central bank forms projections about t + 1 economic conditions and sets its policy instrument t .
2. Firms observe t , x t , and t as well as individual speci…c signals about t + 1 shocks. Firms may also observe announcements made by the central bank.
3. Those …rms that can adjust their price set prices for t + 1.
4. Period t + 1 actual shocks occur and t+1 and x t+1 are realized.
A randomly choose fraction 1 ! of …rms optimally set their price for period t+1. If is the discount factor, one can show that (see Walsh 2007b)
where j;t+1 is the log price …rm j sets for period t + 1 relative to the period t average log price level (i.e., p j;t+1 p t ), E j t t+1 is …rm j 0 s expectation about the average i;t+1 being set by other adjusting …rms, E j t x t+1 is …rm j 0 s expectation about the output gap in t + 1, e s t+1 is the aggregate, common cost shock, and E j t t+2 is …rm j 0 s expectation about future in ‡ation. For simplicity, I assume (1) is linearized around a zero-in ‡ation steady state.
To keep the model simple, I represent the demand side of the model in a very stylized, reduced form manner. Monetary policy is represented by the central bank's choice of t and by any announcements the central bank might make. I assume t is observed at the start of the period so that any …rm that sets its price in period t can condition its choice on the central bank's policy action. The output gap is then equal to
where e v t+1 is a demand shock. While I will call t the central bank's instrument, it essentially represents the central bank's intended output gap.
Information
As noted, there are three fundamental disturbances in the model: e s t representing cost factors that, for a given output gap and expectations of future in ‡ation, generate ine¢ cient in ‡ation ‡uctuations; e v t , the aggregate demand disturbance; and e u t , a shock to the gap between the ‡exible-price output gap and the e¢ cient output gap. I assume each is serially and mutually uncorrelated.
Firms in setting prices and the central bank in setting its policy instrument must act before learning the actual realizations of the aggregate shocks. Firm j's idiosyncratic information e i j;t+1 for i = s; v; u is related to the aggregate shock according to The i j;t+1 terms are identically and independently distributed across …rms and time. These signals are private in the sense that they are unobserved by other agents. For convenience, each i j;t+1 will be referred to as a noise term, even though s j;t+1 is actually the idiosyncratic component of the …rm's cost shock. All stochastic variables are assumed to be normally distributed. De…ne the signal to noise ratio i j = 2 i = 2 i + 2 j;i , where 2 i is the variance of e i and 2 j;i is the variance of i j . Let j;t+1 denote the vector of private signals received by …rm j, and let t+1 = R j;t+1 be the information aggregated over …rms.
The central bank combines its information, models, and judgement to obtain forecasts of future economic disturbances. It will be convenient to represent this information, in parallel with the treatment of …rm information, as signals on the three aggregate disturbances: The central bank's objective is to minimize, under discretion, a standard quadratic loss function that depends on in ‡ation variability and output gap variability. Speci…cally, loss is given by
where e u t is equal to stochastic variation in the gap between the ‡exible-price output gap (x) and the welfare-maximizing output gap.
With stagged price adjustment, new Keynesian models imply that the welfare costs of in ‡ation variability arise from the dispersion of relative prices it generates (Rotemberg and Woodford 1995, Woodford 2003a). Relative price dispersion can arise from in ‡ation (because of staggered price adjustment) and because of informational asymmetries across …rms. It can be shown (see the appendix) that the variance of relative prices across …rms depends on 2 t and on the noise in the signals received by individual …rms. Thus, social loss is given by
where z 2 t is relative price dispersion arising from asymmetric information across individual …rms with the appropriate weight on this source of loss relative to 2 t given by
The loss associated with information dispersion can be reduced if the central bank provides more information. However, this loss is not a¤ected by the period-by-period policy choice the central bank makes in setting its instrument (conditional on the policy regime that de…nes the type of announcements the central bank makes). This, under discretion, the central bank takes the term z 2 t in (4) due to informational dispersion as given and minimizes (3).
We can now evaluate equilibrium under each policy regime.
Equilibrium under the opaque regime
In regime o, …rms observe their own private signals and the central bank's instrument. In regime f , the central bank provides its forecasts (equivalently, its signals) directly to the public. 13 In the absence of central bank announcements, …rm j 0 s new information is given by its private signals and the policy instrument. The new information available to …rm j consists of j;t+1 and t . Assume beliefs about monetary policy are
where o is 1 3. These beliefs are consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium under discretionary monetary policy.
such that o 1 is 3 3 and o 2 is 3 1, where the ij th element of o 1 gives the e¤ect of the …rm's j th signal on its forecast of the i th shock. Similarly, the i th element of o 2 is the e¤ect of t on the …rm's forecast of the i th shock. Firm j 0 s expectation of Z t+1 is
Because the …rm's signals on the di¤erent shocks are uncorrelated, o 1 would, in the absence of the observation of t , consist of a diagonal matrix with the signal to noise ratios along the diagonal. The o¤-diagonal elements of o 1 can be non-zero when the …rm combines its own information with t to forecast the shocks. For example, suppose t > 0. This might indicate a response by the central bank to a negative demand shock, a negative cost shock, or a positive welfare gap shock. If the …rm's signal on the demand shock is positive, then given t , this makes it less likely the central bank is reacting to a negative demand shock. The …rm will therefore alter its forecast of cost and target shocks.
The appendix shows that the equilibrium strategy for …rm j will take the form
where b o 1 is 1 3. Under both regimes, the expression for the coe¢ cients on j;t+1 in the …rm's equilibrium strategy take the same form, and these are given in the appendix. 14 The appendix shows that the impact of the instrument on an individual …rm's pricing decision is
where i is a 3 1 vector of zeros with a one in the i th place. Equation (6) illustrates the channels through which a policy action a¤ects the pricing decisions of …rms. The …rst term, (1 ! ) =! is the standard e¤ect operating through the output gap. Since in ‡ation is (1 !) times the pricing decision of the individual …rm in a standard new Keynesian model, the e¤ect on aggregate in ‡ation operating through this terms would be 
and varies with the quality of private sector information, as measured by the signal to noise ratio i j . The horizontal line is drawn at 0:3455, the impact of on in ‡ation in the absence of informational e¤ects. When …rms have perfect information on the shocks ( i j = 1), the policy instrument conveys no information, and the e¤ect of on in ‡ation equals 0:3455.
However, when conveys information (i.e., when i j < 1), its impact on in ‡ation is signi…cantly reduced. Movements in are partially attributed to the central bank's response to the various shocks. A rise in , for example, lowers …rms'forecasts of demand shocks. Since the net e¤ect on the expected output gap is t + E j t e v t+1 , the e¤ect on price setting behavior and in ‡ation is less then the change in . A rise in also leads …rms to reduce their forecast of cost shocks, partially o¤setting the positive impact of a rise in on in ‡ation. For a given quality of private sector information, the informational channel become more important as the central bank's information improves and private …rms place more weight on the information conveyed by policy actions. The informational e¤ects are larger, therefore, when the central bank has better quality information (compare the solid line in Figure 1 for i cb = 0:5 to the dashed line for i cb = 0:9). Operating in a discretionary regime, the central bank sets policy optimally in each period based on its current forecasts about the future state of the economy. The …rst order condition for minimizing the expected value of the central bank's loss function (3) subject to (2) and (7) is given in the appendix. This …rst order condition can be solved for the optimal policy responses, and their values are also given in the appendix.
The solution to the model is obtained numerically by beginning with initial values for the policy coe¢ cients, using these to obtain o , b o 1 , and b o 2 , and then obtaining new values for the policy coe¢ cients. This process continues until convergence. Once the equilibrium values of b o 1 and b o 2 and the policy coe¢ cients are obtained, aggregate in ‡ation is given by
while the welfare gap is
Equilibrium with full transparency
I interpret full transparency as a regime in which the central bank shares its information on the economy. Within the context of the model, this would mean that the central bank publishes its signals on the various disturbances so that cb;t+1 becomes known to all …rms. Equivalently, the central bank could publish its forecasts for in ‡ation and the output gap. In a transparent regime, the instrument is no longer a source of information to the private sector. This alters the impact of t on in ‡ation and a¤ects the central bank's incentives in setting policy. When the central bank provides its information to the public, the central bank's information set is a subset of the public's information set. In this context, Svensson and Woodford (2002) have shown that certainly equivalence holds with respect to the central bank's policy problem. In particular, this implies that the optimal policy will be independent of the quality of either the central bank's information or the private sector's information.
In ‡ation will equal (1 !) t+1 , so
and is independent of any informational e¤ects. The optimal policy coe¢ -cients for this case, giving the policy response to each signal, are given in the appendix.
The value of releasing information
We can now compare the e¤ects of providing information by comparing outcomes under the opaque regime and the transparent regime. To assess outcomes under the two regimes, the model is solved using the same calibrated parameters as employed in section 3.2 (i.e., ! = 0:65, = 0:99, = 1:8). I initially set the variances of all shocks equal to 1. For the loss function, I set x = 1=16, re ‡ecting the use of quarterly in ‡ation rates. Table 1 shows the loss under each regime for di¤erent combinations of the signal to noise ratios for both the private sector and the central bank.
The …rst thing to note is the loss is increasing in the quality of private sector information (moving across rows from left to right) and decreasing in the quality of the central bank's information (comparing the top panel to the bottom panel). Better private information makes expectations more sensitive to signals and so increases the volatility of expectations. Greater volatility of expectations produces more in ‡ation volatility. This is welfare decreasing. Better central bank information is welfare improving because it allows the central bank to engage in more e¤ective stabilization policies that reduce the volatility of in ‡ation and the output welfare gap. While Morris and Shin (2002) suggest that improved common information could reduce welfare, the results in Table 1 are consistent with Hellwig (2004) and Svensson (2006) who argue that better quality central bank information generally improves welfare. When i j = 1, …rms observe the true shocks perfectly. In this case, the release of information or projections by the central bank is irrelevant and the loss is the same under both regimes, as shown in the last column of Table 1 . When private information is imperfect, loss di¤ers under the two regimes, and the regime with lowest loss is indicated in bold. The rows labelled " equivalent"express the reduction in loss under the optimal regime in terms of the reduction in average in ‡ation (expressed at annual rates) that would yield a similar reduction in loss. The results in Table 1 are robust to variations in the variances of the underlying shocks. 15 The …nding that transparency can lower welfare when private information is poor is suggestive of the Morris and Shin argument that noisy public information can decrease welfare. To investigate whether this is the e¤ect that accounts for the relative performance of the two regimes, one can calculate the sources of loss under each regime. From (4), loss arises from in ‡ation variability, welfare gap variability, and relative price dispersion due to information heterogeneity. Table 2 shows each of these components for the case i cb = 0:9 corresponding to the lower panel of Table  1 (results are similar for i cb = 0:5). Table 2 reveals three di¤erences between the opaque equilibria and the transparent equilibria that are independent of the quality of private information. First, in ‡ation is less volatile when policy is transparent. Second, the contribution of welfare gap volatility to the overall loss is much larger when policy is transparent. And third, the welfare cost of relative price 1 5 For each 2 i , its value was changed between 2 and 0:01 while the other variances were held …xed at 1. dispersion is much smaller when policy is transparent. When i j is very low, opacity is the preferred regime because the welfare gap is much more stable. As will be discussed further below, the information channel of policy actions is large when private information quality is poor and this distorts the central bank's incentive such that policy reacts too little to cost shocks. This makes in ‡ation more volatility but leaves the welfare gap more stable. Both in ‡ation and output gap volatility in the opaque regime increase as i j rises, so that transparency becomes the preferred regime when private sector information is good. 16 Table 3 shows the optimal policy responses to the central bank's three signals for i j equal to 0:4 and 0:8, and for i cb equal to 0:5 and 0:9. Response coe¢ cients in the transparent regime are independent of the quality of both the private sector's and the central bank's information. This result follows from the demonstration by Svensson and Woodford (2002) that the central bank's decision problem satis…es the conditions for certainty equivalence if the private sector has more information than the central bank. This is the case in the transparent regime since private agents know both the central bank's signals and their own private signals. The way informational e¤ects in the opaque regime distort stabilization policy is clear from the muted response (in absolute value) to signals on the cost shock and ampli…ed response to signals on the welfare gap shock. The trade o¤ between in ‡ation and welfare gap volatility is clearly present -policy responds more to stabilize in ‡ation under the transparent regime and, as a result, the welfare gap is more volatility, as was shown in Table 2 .
In addition, transparency allows the central bank to more e¢ ciently neutralize the e¤ects of expected demand shocks. This can be seen by comparing the policy reaction coe¢ cients under the two regimes. Under transparency, expected demand shocks are completely o¤set (i.e., v = 1) regardless of the quality of private sector or central bank information. Under the opaque regime, v = 1 only when private agents have perfect information on the shocks. Otherwise, v is less than one in absolute value and demand shocks are not fully o¤set. Under the opaque regime, the public will confuse movements in the instrument designed to o¤set forecasted demand shocks with movements associated with responds to either cost or welfare gap shocks. As a consequence, instrument moves aimed at o¤setting demand shocks can a¤ect in ‡ation expectations and cause actual in ‡ation to ‡uctuate as the public attributes part of the instrument change to these other shocks. This makes it optimal to not o¤set demand shocks completely. Once the public can infer the central bank's estimate of demand shocks, as it can under transparency, there is no longer any reason not to fully react to insulate the output gap and in ‡ation from projected demand shocks, so
In new Keynesian models, the welfare costs of in ‡ation are due to the relative price dispersion that arises with staggered price adjustment. Heterogeneity in the information available to individual …rms will also create relative price dispersion. Since information provided by the central bank is common information, it can help reduce relative price dispersion. Figure 2 shows the measure of relative price dispersion due to asymmetric information as a function of the quality of private sector information. The solid line with asterisks corresponds to the case of poor quality central bank information ( i cb = 0:5) under the opaque regime, and the unconnected asterisks correspond to the opaque regime with high quality central bank information ( cb = 0:9). The diamonds indicate the outcomes under the transparent regime with low quality central bank information (the solid line) and high quality central bank information (the unconnected diamonds).
When i j = 1, all …rms share the same information, so dispersion due to heterogeneous information goes to zero under either policy regime. However, relative price dispersion is increasing in i j for low values of i j . When …rms have very poor quality information, the level of informational heterogeneity is high, but because the information is of low quality, …rms to not respond strongly to it. As information quality improves, …rms react more strongly Now consider the role of the quality of the central bank's information under the opaque regime. Relative price dispersion is lower when the central bank's information is good than when it is poor, though the loss from relative price dispersion actually constitutes a larger fraction of total social loss when the central bank's information is good. This is due to the better stabilization the central bank can achieve when it has better information on the economy. Not surprisingly, relative price dispersion is always lower under the corresponding transparency regime. For the same reason, better central bank information reduces relative price dispersion under the transparency regime.
Conclusions
When the private sector and the central bank do not share the same information, policy actions become a source of information to the public. Policy has both direct e¤ects on the output gap and indirect e¤ects through the information conveyed by the central bank's actions. Under an opaque policy regime, however, certainty equivalence does not hold, and informational channels a¤ect the incentives faced by the central bank. Optimal policy will depend on the quality of both the central bank's information and the public's information. The central bank stabilizes in ‡ation less and the welfare gap more than would occur in a transparent policy regime.
Under complete transparency, private agents have access to the central bank's assessment of the economy. In this case, policy actions no longer provide any additional information and the policy problem satis…es a form of certainty equivalence (Svensson and Woodford 2002) . Optimal policy is independent of the quality of the central bank's information.
Consistent with the work of Svensson (2006) and Hellwig (2004) , better central bank information was found to improve welfare. With better information, the central bank can implement more e¤ective stabilization policies. The e¤ect of providing more information by making announcements about projected in ‡ation and the output gap is more ambiguious. Transparency always acts to lower relative price dispersion across …rms by expanding the set of common information, but central bank announcements can make expectations more volatile, particularly if …rms have relatively poor information. Transparency dominates opacity when the private sector has relatively good information, since in this case …rms do not overreact to the information contained in the central bank's announcements. However, if private sector information is poor, central bank announcements can reduce welfare. So while better central bank information is desirable, more central bank information may not be. 
